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The "Battle We Lost
at Home" Revisited
Official Military Histories and the
Battle of the St. Lawrence
Roger Sarty

T

ie Importance of this conference*
Is that It gathers together so many
of the threads of the history and legacy
of the St Lawrence battle. These threads
include the memories of people who
lived through the events and physical
artifacts of the battle, treasures that are
especially precious because, 60 years
after the fact, memories are being
extinguished, and many artifacts have already
been lost. Among the artifacts are the traces the
Second World War left on the landscape including notably the Mont Joli airport, and the
naval base and fortifications at Gaspe. Durable
as these remnants must have once seemed, they
too have been greatly changed over time, by
human intervention and by the erosion of the
elements. Something that has changed much less
is the geography and the environment of le bas
St. Laurent and the gulf, which so greatly
influenced the battle. The location of the
conference here at Rimouski, close by the Bic
Islands where convoys formed up and dispersed,
and close by the western limits of U-boat hunting
missions has enriched the understanding of the
participants, and the value of the proceedings.
* This paper was originally presented at the conference The
Battle of the St. Lawrence: Impacts on the Gulf Population
from the Second World War to the Present,' organized by the
Musee Naval de Quebec, at Rimouski, Quebec, 8-11 May
2002. Participants included members of the historical,
museum, teaching, armed forces, and media communities,
as well as local residents who lived through the events of
1942. It is published here through the kind permission of
M. Andre Kirouac, director of the Musee Naval de Quebec.

The subject of the present paper is
just one of the threads of the battle's
legacy, the Government of Canada's
official military histories of the battle.
These comments are something of a
progress report - what has been done
and what is new. The remarks are
intended to encourage interested people
to use the official military histories as
tools for further work. Although the histories
are based on voluminous government and
military records in Ottawa, and in British,
American and German archives, the histories
do not - and could not - capture the full human
experience and meaning of the battle in this
region.
There were, a n d p e r h a p s still a r e ,
widespread perceptions that the St. Lawrence
battle was an unknown event, 'The War Story
Our Leaders Kept Quiet,' in the words of an
important article that appeared in a national
magazine in 1972. l These perceptions, the very
opposite of the facts, demonstrate that historical
awareness must be nurtured, by such means as
the work of the present conference.
When U-553 opened the St Lawrence
campaign by sinking the merchant vessels Leto
and Nicoya on the night of 11-12 May 1942,
Angus L. Macdonald, minister of National
Defence for Naval Services, b r o k e his
department's own security regulations to
announce the sinkings to the press and in
Parliament the very next day. His actions cleared
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the way for the national press immediately to
run detailed articles that featured interviews with
the survivors from the ships' crews who spoke
bluntly about how the attacks had been a
complete surprise: the naval shipping control
authorities had not yet designated the St.
Lawrence as a danger zone. There does not seem
much doubt that Macdonald's action was
politically motivated. The country had only
weeks before been badly divided on linguistic
lines in the plebiscite that asked the electorate
to release the government from its promise not
to send conscripted troops overseas; Englishspeaking provinces had responded with an
overwhelming 'yes' and Quebec with an equally
resounding 'no.' The government therefore
believed that Kapitanleutnant Thurmann, the
commander of U-553, had unwittingly struck a
blow for Canadian national unity. Frenchspeaking Canadians might see that the war was
no longer a remote event that had no direct
i m p a c t on t h e m , a n d E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g
Canadians might understand that there were
good military reasons to keep conscripted troops
in Canada. 2
During the renewed U-boat attacks in the
summer and fall of 1942, the navy delayed the
release of information, so that the enemy would
not have confirmation of success soon enough
to allow the German U-boat command quickly
to deploy additional submarines to the area. The
government, however, broke its own rules again
when U-69 s a n k the Newfoundland ferry
Caribou, with heavy loss of civilian life, on the
night of 13-14 October 1942. Rumours might
wildly magnify the scope of the disaster, causing
widespread panic and unnecessary further
suffering among the families of victims and
s u r v i v o r s : the navy allowed t h e p r e s s
immediately to publish full details
At this same time, Adelard Godbout, premier
of Quebec, warned the federal prime minister,
William Lyon Mackenzie King, that losses around
Gaspe and in le bas St. Laurent were causing
serious alarm in those regions. Godbout's advice
followed repeated d e m a n d s from federal
Members of Parliament from the region for fuller
information and assurances the government
would organize more effective defence measures.
During the winter of 1942-3, therefore, the
government released in Parliament the names

of all 21 ships that had been sunk in the St
Lawrence. 3 Macdonald and C.G. Power, the
minister of National Defence for Air, also
responded to the most alarmist reports that
defences were non-existent or ill-organized, with
detailed information that showed these to be
rumours without foundation. In the one instance
in which the armed forces had been slow to
respond to an accurate report by a shorewatcher
of a U-boat off Gaspe, the government frankly
acknowledged that errors had been made. A
large government-sponsored book, Canada and
the War at Sea,4 published in 1944 by the
popular authors Stephen Leacock and Leslie
Roberts, featured a chapter on The Battle of the
Gulf.' It contains a reasonably full account of
the operations, of the alarm in the St Lawrence
region, and of the government's policy of
openness.
In 1946 the navy issued a press release that
gave fuller military particulars about the battle
of the St Lawrence. 5 The first official history of
the navy to appear, in 1950, fleshed out
additional detail, and classed the operations in
1942 as 'an almost unmitigated defeat for
Canada,'but allowed that '[i]t was a defeat
deliberately and unavoidably accepted....
Adequate defence of the St. Lawrence would have
meant the recall of many Canadian ships from
the Atlantic; and such re-disposition would have
been of far more benefit to Germany than all the
achievements of Hartwig [the most successful
U-boat commander in the St Lawrence] and his
companions.' 6 A further official volume by
Gilbert Tuckerl, completed in 1948 but not
published until 1952, included an analysis of
how the government's decision to close the St
Lawrence to overseas shipping in the fall of 1942
diminished the effectiveness of C a n a d a ' s
transportation system, with losses to carrying
capacity of strategic material more important
than the actual losses of ships. 7
As a result of the early production of the
naval official histories, maritime aspects of
Second World War had a low priority in the
Department of National Defence historical
programme until the late 1970s to 1980s. At that
time the historians working on the Royal
Canadian Air Force history project began to
investigate the important role of aircraft in the
protection of shipping during the Battle of the
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Atlantic. Preliminary work on the St Lawrence
revealed a much larger story than anyone had
suspected, and Dr. W.A.B. Douglas, Director of
History, authorized one of the historians to
devote full time work to the St. Lawrence story
for the better part of a year. The result of this
research was the full chapter on the St Lawrence
in Dr. Douglas' The Creation of a National Air
Force: The Official History of the Royal
Canadian Air Force, Vol. II.8
This chapter related a significant story that
had never before been pieced together. Because
of the shortage of naval escorts owing to the huge
demands of the convoy system on the North
American coast and across the Atlantic, Eastern
Air Command of the RCAF had accepted, at the
navy's r e q u e s t , a major s h a r e of t h e
responsibility for the defence of shipping in the
gulf. In the wake of the heavy losses of ships in
late August and early S e p t e m b e r 1942,
moreover, Eastern Air Command had removed
aircraft from Atlantic duties to concentrate as
many as 48 front-line anti-submarine bombers
in the gulf and its ocean approaches, 9 including
a large detachment of bombers that operated

from the Mont Joli air base. These aircraft,
although they did not sink any U-boats,
repeatedly sighted and attacked U-517, the most
successful of the submarines, and prevented the
U-boat from achieving any more successes
during the last three weeks of its mission in the
St. Lawrence. Moreover, research in German
archives, greatly assisted by Professor Michael
Hadley 10 who collaborated with the air force
historians, revealed that more U-boats had
followed U-517 into the St. Lawrence than had
previously been believed, and stayed for a much
longer period of time. U-43, U-106, U-69 and
U-518 all made patrols of two weeks or more in
September to November 1942, but nevertheless
together sank only three vessels, as compared
to the eighteen sunk by U-553, U-132, U-165
and U-517 in May to September. The reduction
in shipping traffic only partly accounted for the
meagre results of the continued German effort.
Ships still sailed, both independently and in
convoys, but the air patrols were so intense that
the U-boats did not dare run on the surface long
enough to sight and chase the merchant vessels.
Indeed, the captain of a fifth submarine assigned
to follow up U-517's successes in the gulf, U-183,
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St. Lawrence Convoy by Commander Harold Thomas Beament

was so intimidated by the air patrols off Sydney
that he decided it was too dangerous to enter.''
The air force research also turned up crucial
information on Canadian naval intelligence that
had still been classified when the naval
historians had published in the early 1950s.
Since the beginning of the war naval radio
stations and other government radio stations
operating under naval instructions, had been
taking directional bearings on transmissions by
German warships and sending these bearings
to British naval intelligence. By plotting these
bearings together with others on the same
transmissions by radio stations in Britain,
Iceland and the Caribbean, British naval
intelligence could estimate the approximate
position of the transmitting warship. By mid1942, the Canadian navy had developed its own
plotting and analysis capabilities, and begun
quickly to pass estimated positions of U-boats
transmitting in Canadian coastal waters to
Eastern Air Command so that aircraft could
immediately search the areas. In September
1942 the navy and the air force began to apply
this system in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. One of

the Lockheed Hudson bomber units transferred
at that time from Atlantic coast stations into the
gulf was 113 Squadron, which had led the way
in using the navy's plots of estimated U-boat
positions to concentrate air patrols in the most
promising areas. It was 113 Squadron aircraft,
using this system, that repeatedly attacked
U-517 and thereby brought an end to its success.
Other squadrons followed this example, with the
result that the four U-boats that followed U-517
seldom dared remain on the surface because
aircraft were so constantly overhead.
As a result of these discoveries during the
preparation of the air force history, the St
Lawrence battle became a focal point of research
for a new official history of the navy on which a
small team began to work in the late 1980s. The
Second World War volume was about two-thirds
of the way to completion when the deep
government cutbacks of 1993-96 brought the
project nearly to a halt. Cuts in the Directorate
of History from 32 personnel to ten left only two
of the five naval historians on staff. Dr. Serge
Bernier became director in these difficult times.
Despite many competing pressures and the
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extreme shortage of staff, he organized the
production in 1997-8 of Canada and the Battle
of the Atlantic, which featured a chapter on the
St. Lawrence with new naval information that
built on the results of the air force project. This
moderately-sized book was designed to make
some of the most important parts of the naval
research available to the public until the full
naval history could be completed, a date that at
that time seemed far in the future.
In 1999, however, the department of National
Defence supported the revival of the naval history
project. The first of these large volumes was
recently published and includes a chapter of
some 50 printed pages on the St. Lawrence
battle.12
There are two particularly interesting areas
in which the new work contributes to broader
understanding of the St. Lawrence battle. The
first is to establish more clearly the strategic
context. The St. Lawrence battle was only one
part of the large-scale U-boat offensive into North
American coastal waters that began in January
1942, after the entry of the United States into
the war in December 1941; previously Hitler had
banned U-boat attacks west of Newfoundland for
fear of triggering American belligerence. The new
book shows in detail that the main weight of the
initial German assault-by 14 of the 17 U-boats
that crossed the Atlantic - fell in Newfoundland
and Canadian waters, but that the Canadian
forces, despite shortages of ships, aircraft,
t r a i n e d p e r s o n n e l a n d e q u i p m e n t , were
successful in defending shipping. Most of the
shipping losses were among unconvoyed ships,
that is ships that were sailing alone without
immediate protection, and the Canadian navy
very rapidly established coastal convoys between
Canadian, Newfoundland and, subsequently,
northern US ports. Any and every naval escort
was pressed into service, and these convoys often
sailed under the protection of only one or two
small warships. Nevertheless, the U-boats soon
shifted the weight of their assault to the US coast,
as far south as Florida, and then into the
Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico. The US Navy did
not establish coastal convoys, incorrectly
believing that the small number of escorts then
available could not provide sufficient protection,
and that the convoys would merely create
clustered targets for the enemy. The U-boats,

however, as events in Canadian waters proved,
had no wish to take the time and run the risks
necessary to find and attack convoys. German
policy was to sink as much shipping as possible
with the least possible danger of counterattack,
and that made independently sailed ships the
target of choice. During the first eight months of
1942, the Germans were thus able to destroy
over 100 ships per month along the US coast.
Canadian defence planners had always
worried - in the First World War, and when war
threatened again in the late 1930s - that such a
submarine assault on the North American coast
would inevitably extend into the St. Lawrence.
Every winter during the Second World War the
navy drew up detailed plans as to what measures
could be taken in the St. Lawrence with the
warships and maritime aircraft actually available
when the ice cleared and shipping again began
to sail in the following spring. The great demands
of the new coastal convoys early in 1942 left very
little for such an emergency at the very time it
seemed most likely. On the advice of the British
Admiralty (which itself had contributed a large
n u m b e r of British escorts to help out in
Newfoundland, Canadian and US waters) that
all escorts were urgently needed on the Atlantic
routes, the navy assigned only a small number
of Bangor minesweepers and wooden Fairmile
motor patrol craft to the Gulf. Many of these were
newly-built vessels that would not complete until
the spring and summer of 1942. Given the
shortage of resources, the naval staff also
decided that convoys would not be organized in
the gulf until merchant ships had actually been
sunk there, and further decided that if the lightly
escorted convoys suffered serious losses to the
submarines, it would be wiser to close the gulf
to shipping than to divert escorts from the
critically important Atlantic routes.
The navy received intelligence that a U-boat
might be in the Gulf the day before the attacks
on Leto and Nicoya, and requested the air force
to begin to patrol in pursuit of the submarine.
When the destruction of the two ships confirmed
that a U-boat was present and active, the navy
and air force swiftly implemented the plans
made the preceding winter. All shipping was held
in port for a few days until defended convoys
could be organized, and the air force greatly
increased its patrols; these measures were
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Sailors from a merchant ship torpedoed in the Gulf of St. Lawrence are provided
with "survivor's bundles" by the Women's Naval Auxiliary Services, May 1942.

effective and U-553 was unable to make any
further attacks on shipping.
At this same time, the pressures on the
limited pool of escorts increased even more.
During the spring of 1942 U-boat attacks on
tanker traffic in southern US waters virtually cut
off the supply of crude oil from the Caribbean
to refineries at Montreal and Halifax; much of
eastern Canada, including the ship refuelling
facilities at Halifax a n d St. J o h n ' s ,
Newfoundland, depended upon the production
of these refineries. The Canadian naval staff
therefore pulled two escorts from Atlantic convoy
service to run special tanker convoys to and from
the Caribbean. This was a success, in part
because the tanker convoys did not have to make
the week-long run from Halifax up the St.
Lawrence; in 1941 an oil pipeline had opened
between Portland, Maine and Montreal.
The British and Americans agreed that
Canada could redeploy a total of six ocean
escorts - corvettes - from the Atlantic routes on

a long term basis for regular tanker escort duty
to the Caribbean, with the intention that they
should escort British as well as Canadian
tankers. J u s t as the new Tanker Escort Force
was assembling at Halifax, U-132 entered the
Gulf and made determined, successful attacks
on the weakly-escorted convoys. The Canadian
naval staff, despite the contrary advice of the
British and Americans, immediately began to
deploy the tanker escorts into the gulf to
strengthen the defences of the convoys there, and
scaled back the size of the tanker convoys to the
Caribbean. When, in September, U-517 and
U-165 made still heavier attacks in the gulf, the
Canadian naval staff pulled additional escorts
from the Atlantic routes, including two British
destroyers that were operating under Canadian
control; it was at this time that Eastern Air
Command made large-scale redeployments of
aircraft from coastal stations into the gulf. Far
from ignoring the St. Lawrence defences in the
gulf, as anxious Members of Parliament and
journalists charged, the Canadian forces defied
the priorities of the Allied high command in
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order to strengthen the defences as much as was
humanly possible.
On 9 September 1942, as losses in the gulf
convoys were continuing to increase despite the
recent reinforcements, the Canadian government
closed the gulf to ocean shipping on the advice
of the naval staff. Thus, it seemed, the gulf had
proved indefensible with the resources available,
and the navy was doing what had always been
provided for in the plans.
Allied priorities for escort deployments
changed at this time, however, as did the whole
organization of shipping defence in North
American waters. It was, in fact, these changes
that brought the closure of the gulf, although
the recent heavy losses undoubtedly influenced
the decision. The immediate reason for the
decision to close the gulf was a personal appeal
from Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great
Britain to Canada's prime minister, William Lyon
Mackenzie King, asking that Canada provide as
many as 16 corvettes to help protect the troop
and supply convoys that would carry British and
US forces for the invasion of North Africa
planned for early November 1942. This was the
first western Allied land offensive against the
Axis powers, and it was the most urgent and
pressing war operation.
Closure of the gulf was the most immediately
practical method of freeing up escorts to provide
these corvettes because Canadian, British and
US shipping authorities had already agreed, in
August, that the huge losses of Allied shipping
in US waters could only be stopped by greatly
curtailing shipping to and from Canadian ports,
and making New York the focal point for the
shipment of supplies from North America to
Britain. The Canadian tanker convoys to the
Caribbean had helped to show that even lightly
escorted convoys along the US coast would
greatly reduce the number of German attacks,
but experience had demonstrated that the
coastal convoy system would have to be
comprehensive. As the US forces had gradually
improved defences along the Atlantic seaboard
in the spring and early summer of 1942, the
U-boats had simply shifted further south to the
heavily travelled and still weakly protected

waters of the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico.
Escorts were still not available in sufficient
numbers to implement such a large system of
new convoys without economies somewhere, and
all authorities agreed those economies had to
come in Canadian waters.
Since the entry of the US into the war the
proportion of North American shipping carrying
supplies to Great Britain that sailed from US
ports had completely outstripped the amount
that sailed from Canada's Atlantic ports and the
St. Lawrence. It was therefore much more
economical, in terms of escorts, to bring the
relatively small number of ships from Canadian
ports south to New York, than to continue to
escort very large numbers of ships north from
US ports for transatlantic convoy assembly at
Halifax and Sydney, Nova Scotia. In AugustSeptember, as British and US escorts
implemented a complete system of coastal
convoys on the US coast and in the Caribbean
and Gulf of Mexico (with the Canadian tanker
escorts also participating), New York replaced
the Nova Scotia ports as the assembly point for
transatlantic convoys. The RCN was able assume
full responsibility for the escort of the big
transatlantic convoys from New York because it
was no longer necessary to move so many ships
between Canadian ports and to and from
northern US ports: as the main transatlantic
convoys sailed north from New York, groups of
merchant ships that had loaded at Canadian
ports simply sailed out and joined under local
escort of small numbers of warships that had
only to make a short shuttle out and back from
Halifax and Sydney. In short, the decision to
close the St. Lawrence was driven by the needs
for escorts for the invasion of North Africa, and
even more so by the need to stop losses in the
Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean than by successes

This photo was taken from a Lockheed Hudson of
113 (Br) Squadron during an attack on U-165 on 9
September 1942 just south of Anticosti Island.

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2003

7

Canadian Military History, Vol. 12 [2003], Iss. 2, Art. 4

of U-517 and U-l65 in the St. Lawrence. In July
to September the U-boats sank 16 vessels in the
St. Lawrence river and gulf; in those same
months the enemy destroyed 104 vessels in the
Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico.13 There was more
than a little of truth in the statement Angus L.
Macdonald made in the House of Commons in
March 1943:
I say that the battle of the St. Lawrence has not
been lost... .of the total tonnage which used the
river and the gulf last year, only three out of every
thousand tons was sunk...I know the general
average of convoy sinkings throughout the world,
and I can say that if you only lose three tons out
of every thousand which you have at sea you are
doing pretty well, in fact somewhat better than
average. We have not lost the battle of the gulf.
Some p e o p l e t h i n k t h e gulf is e a s i l y
defended....Let them remember that the St.
Lawrence river, at the point farthest inland where
an attack was made last year, is thirty miles wide.
That is almost like the open sea. 14

Yet, d e s p i t e t h e s e b r a v e w o r d s , t h e
government and the armed forces did regard the
battle in the St. Lawrence as a defeat. It was that
sense of defeat at the end of 1942 that informed
the original official histories, quoted above, that
were published in the early 1950s.
The new official history seeks to explain why,
when the armed forces had energetically
executed well-conceived plans, effectively
suppressed the U-boats in the gulf after midSeptember, and all the while contributed to much
larger and more important Allied objectives,
there was such a sense of defeat. This is the
second area of investigation that might be of
general interest.
In the St. Lawrence, as was not fully
understood at the time, the Canadian forces
faced conditions that were extraordinarily
favourable to submarines, and extraordinarily
difficult for defending forces. Although
Macdonald was right that the gulf and estuary
of the St. Lawrence are inland seas, there are
also choke points, in the Cabot Straits, between
the Gaspe Peninsula and Anticosti Island, and
in the river west of the Gaspe Peninsula. These
choke points force shipping to follow standard
routes, and thus made it easy for submarines to
locate convoys, whose best protection on the
open ocean w a s t h e e x t r e m e difficulty

submarines had in finding them. At the same
time, the broad and deep waters of the St.
Lawrence enabled submarines quickly to escape
once they had attacked a convoy. Canadian
aircraft and escorts carried primitive radar or
no radar at all for detection of U-boats that fled
at speed on the surface, and, more than was
appreciated at the time, the complex layering of
cold seawater and warm river water blinded the
asdic (sonar) then available for underwater
detection. Given these conditions, it was not
surprising that convoys protected by escorts that
were either weak, or comprised of larger
numbers of warships that had been hastily
assembled with no chance to achieve proper
coordination, suffered heavy losses. The
imperfect u n d e r s t a n d i n g in 1942 of the
challenges of defending shipping in coastal
waters like the gulf, meant that the losses
experienced - which included two RCN escorts
and a USN troopship - were scarcely less
demoralizing for the armed forces than they were
for the population on shore.
The success of closer naval-air cooperation
starting in mid-September 1942, moreover, was
not apparent at the time. Encouraging as were
the initial string of air attacks (and a surface
escort attack) on the unusually bold U-517,
thereafter the Canadian forces never got even a
glimpse of the enemy. Because the Allies were
unable to decrypt German U-boat radio signals
in 1942, no one realized that four U-boats made
long patrols in the gulf in October to November,
and that the defences had all but paralyzed these
submarines while persuading a fifth not to
venture past the Cabot Straits.
Although the U-boats succeeded in sinking
only three ships after mid-September, these
included two of the most dramatic losses: the
steamer Carolus, sunk furthest upriver of all the
losses, close off Metis Beach; and, in the Cabot
Strait, the Newfoundland ferry Caribou. Both
were destroyed by U-69, and this boat, as we
now know from German sources, had been
driven to hide beneath the surface in deep
narrow waters and attack only ships that passed
close by under cover of dark nights because of
the strength of the defences along the main
shipping routes. Unfortunately, these dramatic
successes in October - the parting shots of the
U-boats as they retreated from the St Lawrence
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- coincided with the publication of a series of
articles by the Quebec journalist Edouard
Laurent under the title "Ce qui se passe en
Gaspesie," which reported in powerful terms the
alarm of the population, and their conviction that
they had been abandoned by their governments
in the face of the enemy.
La guerre est tout proche de lui. Un bon nombre
ont vu des sous-marins ennemis; d'autres ont
ete les temoins de torplllages de navires allies;
un plus grand nombre ont entendu dans le
lointaln, le bruit de la canonnade. Ceux qui sont
alles dans les hopitaux de region ont vu ou
e n t e n d u parler des m a r i n s blesses qui se
remettent de leurs blessures....
Ce qui augmente l'angoisse collective, c'est
d'abord le silence du gouvernement sur tout ce
qui se passe dans le bas du fleuve. Les gens de
la Gaspesie savent bien que si le gouvernement
exposait la veritable situation, l'opinion publique
reagirait assez virgoureusement pour exiger une
action plus efficace de la part des authorites... 15

It was these articles that brought Premier
Godbout to alert Mackenzie King to the urgent
need to address the concerns of the population
in the region, which in t u r n brought the
government to increase pressure upon the armed
forces to investigate what had gone wrong in
1942 and prepare detailed plans for greatly
improved measures in 1943. Godbout's warning
stimulated the government's own efforts to reply
more vigorously to critics with much fuller
information about events in the gulf. The
government also directed the armed forces to
work closely with provincial and municipal
authorities in all the areas around the lower river
and gulf to provide better information to the
coastal populations and enlist their cooperation
in keeping a sharp watch and reporting anything
suspicious along those isolated shores. This
programme was a central part of the military
planning for 1943, together with the assignment
of many additional escort warships and bomber
aircraft to the gulf. Yet no U-boats returned to
hunt in the St. Lawrence in 1943, because, as
we now know, the improved Canadian defences
during the fall of 1942 had persuaded the U-boat
command t h a t the gulf was no longer a
promising area for attacks on shipping.

1942, and the capture of Kapitanleutnant Paul
Hartwig a n d m o s t of h i s crew, f u r t h e r
contributed to the sense of defeat among the
senior levels of the Canadian forces, and their
determination to strengthen the gulf defences in
1943. Hartwig and his men spoke freely of their
exploits and of their narrow escapes from the
repeated, and often hair-raising, counterattacks
by Canadian aircraft and warships. Most of what
they said could be confirmed from Canadian
action reports, and both British and Canadian
officers were deeply impressed that the German
submariners had had the confidence to persist
in the face of such determined opposition. If it
was this difficult to deter German submariners,
then there was every reason to expect renewed
attacks in the St. Lawrence in 1943 that would
be as least as heavy as those spearheaded by
Hartwig.
When the first official histories of the navy
appeared in 1950 and 1952, it was the exploits
of U-517 that largely accounted for the authors'
conclusions that Canada had been dealt a defeat.
The full German archives that included reports
from the other submarines that had been forced
continuously to hide immobile beneath the water
and ultimately abandon the gulf were not yet
available to the Canadian naval historians. They
were only too aware of the gaps in the sources
they had to work with and quite consciously laid
the groundwork for additional research by later
generations of official historians. In this sense,
the belated appearance of the new official history
of the navy is nevertheless the result of a
successful passing of the baton.
Perhaps the greatest value of the official
histories is that they bring to bear the substantial
resources needed to assemble and digest the vast
and frequently obscure military and government
archives. This specialized scholarship alone is
not sufficient to bring meaning and currency to
history. It is, however, an essential resource for
others accurately to gather and analyze personal
memories and artifacts, review archives with
fresh eyes, preserve and interpret significant
sites, and produce the memorials, exhibits,
films, and books that, with new perspectives,
keep history vital.

Paradoxically, the destruction of U-517 by
British forces in the eastern Atlantic in November
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Polish division played a key role.
Source material is a b u n d a n t a n d
n o t t h a t difficult t o find. T h e
National Archives of C a n a d a holds
a n u m b e r of critical d o c u m e n t s
r e g a r d i n g 1st Polish A r m o u r e d
Division pre-invasion training a n d
operations in Normandy, while a
n u m b e r of English language
publications describe their
operations in greater detail. The
Sikorski Institute in London holds
a
goldmine
of
untapped
d o c u m e n t a t i o n . History is a b o u t
pinning down facts a n d treating a
significant player, s u c h as the 1 st
Polish Armoured Division, solely
through third party comments still
leaves u s w i t h o u t a n a c c u r a t e
portrayal of the Normandy
campaign.
Please also note the caption on
page 16 is not correct. The
individual in the p h o t o is not a
"trooper" b u t actually a c a p t a i n
(indicated by the three s t a r s on his
beret) from the 10th Mounted Rifle

Regiment,
the
divisional
reconnaissance regiment of the 1st
Polish Armoured Division.
Finally, the a u t h o r points out,
quite correctly, m a n y British a n d
Canadian commanders such as
Montgomery, S i m o n d s , Kitching
and others lacked "armoured
training or armoured command
e x p e r i e n c e . " A m o n g t h o s e with
experience was Major-General
Stanlslaw Maczek, who wiuh his tiny
armoured brigade, fought a spirited
defence a g a i n s t two G e r m a n
divisions in 1939, c o m m a n d e d an
a r m o u r e d brigade in France in
1 9 4 0 a n d led t h e 1 s t P o l i s h
Armoured Division between 1943
a n d 1945.
Yours sincerely,
J o h n R. Grodzinski, Major
Managing Editor
The Army Doctrine
a n d Training Bulletin
grodzinski.jr@forces.gc.ca
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